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I.

ABSTRACT
This thesis examined environmental justice aspects of drinking water policies in four cities

across Michigan: Flint, Birmingham, St. Joseph, and Benton Harbor. An overview of the history of
the environmental justice movement, environmental racism, and drinking water policies provided
the basis for a four-part evaluative criterion to assess environmental justice components at the
municipal level. These criteria include (1) housing tenure, (2) age, size, and service line composition
of the infrastructure, (3) public participation in the policy process, and (4) emergency management
of the city. Findings indicate that environmental justice has come a long way, with cities now
incorporating components into municipal policies regarding drinking water. However, race, income,
and housing tenure remain important indicators for environmental justice concerns despite the
geographical proximity of the cities analyzed.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Water is an essential resource. As poet W.H. Auden once wrote, “Thousands have lived

without love, not one without water.”1 It is necessary for all life to exist, yet modern human and
industrial activity has caused drinking water supplies to be at risk of contamination. Some 80% of
the world’s wastewater from industrial and agricultural sources is released back into the environment
without adequate treatment, contaminating drinking water supplies.2 In the United States, more than
60% of Americans receive their drinking water from surface water sources. Still, approximately 46%
of all rivers and streams, and 31% of all lakes, are polluted and unfit for swimming, fishing, or
drinking.3 In 2014, drinking water quality emerged as a pressing issue when contamination in Flint,
Michigan, sparked international concern about broader socioeconomic and racial disparities in
exposure to contamination. This thesis examined urban drinking water policies in Michigan through
the lens of environmental justice. The distributive and procedural injustice revelations in local
drinking water policies discovered in Flint provided the basis for understanding the environmental
justice implications of such policies in other Michigan cities. This thesis investigated how other
distributive and procedural characteristics of city policies contribute to providing safe drinking water
to residents in four towns across Michigan: Birmingham, Flint, Benton Harbor, and St. Joseph.

1
W.H. Auden, “First Things First,” The New Yorker, March 1, 1957,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1957/03/09/first-things-first.
2
The United Nations World Water Development Report 2017: Wastewaster: The Untapped Resource; Facts and Figures, UNESCO
World Water Assessment Programme, SC-2017/WS/6 (2017): 2,
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000247553.
3
Cheryl Dieter and Molly Maupin, Public Supply and Domestic Water Use in the United States, 2015, United States Geological
Survey Open-File Report 2017-1131 (2017): 3, doi: https://doi.org/10.3133/ofr20171131; The National Rivers and Streams
Assessment 2008-2009, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2009): 1, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/201603/documents/fact_sheet_draft_variation_march_2016_revision.pdf; The National Lakes Assessment (NLA) 2012, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (2012): 1, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/201603/documents/fact_sheet_draft_variation_march_2016_revision.pdf.
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II.

BACKGROUND & SIGNIFICANCE
A. HISTORY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
The environmental justice movement is, at its core, a grassroots movement. Small protests

against unwanted land uses have been going on for decades within communities across the country.
In the 1960s, the campaign reached national attention in the small community of Warren County,
North Carolina, in 1982.4 The North Carolina state government decided the county would be ideal
for a hazardous waste facility that would accept soil contaminated by Polychlorinated biphenyls
(P.C.B.s). This waste resulted from the illegal dumping of P.C.B. waste along roadways. P.C.B.s can
cause cancer, genetic defects, neurological deficits, and endocrine disruption, among other potential
health effects.5 Officials arrested more than 500 Warren County residents and supporters during six
weeks of protests. Despite this, the state ultimately won the battle, and the company built the
facility. However, the events of Warren County were not a failure as they drew mass media attention
and ignited the flame of what is now a federally recognized Environmental Justice (E.J.) Movement.
The E.J. Movement works to eliminate environmental racism, a concept well-articulated in
the 1987 report, Toxic Waste and Race in the United States. 6 The overall summary of this report
indicated a correlation that is “virtually impossible” to be a result of chance between the location of
commercial waste facilities and predominantly minority communities.7 Race is crucial in
understanding the growing issue of uncontrolled waste sites and the ever-increasing number of
environmental concerns and resulting health effects across the country. Warren County and other

4

“55 Arrested in Protest at a Toxic Dump in Carolina,” The New York Times, September 16, 1982,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1982/09/16/issue.html.
5
“Learn about Polychlorinated Biphenyls,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accessed January 25, 2021,
https://www.epa.gov/pcbs/learn-about-polychlorinated-biphenyls-pcbs#healtheffects.
6
Commission for Racial Justice, “Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States,” United Church of Christ (1987).
7
Commission for Racial Justice, 23.
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environmentally driven protests energized the existing civil rights movement by adopting
environmental quality as another factor in pursuing justice. Emboldened by the findings of the Toxic
Waste and Race report and emerging literature on environmental racism, the E.J. Movement
continually gained traction and credibility, spreading to traditionally white environmental
organizations.8
In 1990, the University of Michigan held the first official E.J. conference, titled “The
Michigan Conference on Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards.” This event helped
bring academic credibility to the E.J. movement and bring it into the vernacular of high-level
institutions. The Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.) acknowledges this conference as the
catalyst for the agency’s initial involvement in the movement. Four years later, President Clinton’s
1994 Executive Order “Federal Action to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations
and Low-Income Populations” cemented the involvement of the E.P.A. into the E.J. movement.9
This order directed federal agencies to develop environmental justice strategies that address their
programs’ human health and environmental effects on minority and low-income groups. In addition,
Clinton created a special E.P.A. task force solely devoted to matters of environmental justice.10
Clinton’s Executive Order created an official definition for E.J. The E.P.A. defines
environmental justice as the “fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of
race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and

8

Paul Mohai, “Environmental Justice and the Flint Water Crisis,” Michigan Sociological Review, no. 32 (2018): 2-3,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26528595.
9
“Executive Order 12898 of February 11, 1994, Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations and Low-Income Populations,” Federal Register 59, no. 32, title 3 (February 16, 1994),
https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12898.pdf.
10
““The Origins of EPA,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accessed January 26, 2021,
https://www.epa.gov/history/origins-epa.
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enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”11 The E.P.A.’s definition includes the
two avenues of environmental justice: distributive justice and procedural justice.
As defined by Johannsson-Stenman and Konow, distributive justice “concerns moral
preferences over the distribution of social and economic benefits and burdens among a group of
individuals.”12 When the E.P.A. creates an environmental regulation or local governments discuss
the siting of hazards, “attention is rarely given to the social distribution of environmental outcomes
in impact assessment processes.”13 To address this concern, the E.P.A. further defines their use of
fair treatment to indicate that “no group of people should bear the disproportionate share of
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial
operations or policies.”14 Distributive justice issues in the United States correlate to issues of race
and systemic racism. Examples of this are historical discriminatory housing policies, the
concentration of poverty in urban neighborhoods, and the disproportionate share of environmental
harms by non-white communities. Despite the growing empirical evidence of environmental
injustice along racial and socioeconomic lines, highlighting higher rates of cancer, asthma, and
mortality among poor people and communities of color, especially children, these vulnerable
populations continue to bear the disproportionate burden of environmental harms.15

11

“Learn About Environmental Justice,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accessed January 26, 2021,
https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice.
12
Olof Johansson-Stenman and James Konow, “Fairness Concerns in Environmental Economics – Do They Really
Matter and If So How?,” Working Papers in Economics, no. 398 (2009): 7,
https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/21425/3/gupea_2077_21425_3.pdf.
13
Gordon Walker, “Environmental justice, impact assessment and the politics of knowledge: The implications of
assessing the social distribution of environmental outcomes,” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 30, no. 5 (2010): 317,
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2010.04.005.
14
““Learn About Environmental Justice,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
15
“Environmental Health Disparities and Environmental Justice,” National Institute of Environmental Health Studies,
updated July 16, 2021, https://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/supported/translational/justice/index.cfm.
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Procedural justice is the “participation” aspect of the policy-making process. The E.P.A.
refers to this concept as the “meaningful involvement” of persons, indicating that to effectively
involve a community, those potentially affected must have an opportunity to participate in the
decision-making process. To facilitate this, agencies, or other appropriate decision-makers, must
seek out and facilitate the community’s involvement, consider the community’s concerns, and be
sure that the public’s contribution can influence the final decision.16 In a 1995 report for the
International Institute for Environment and Development, Pretty presents a seven-leveled typology
for local participation with this type of process.17 For example, this thesis focuses upon his sixth
level, titled “interactive participation”:
People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans, and the formation or
strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right rather than just a means of
achieving project goals. Formalized decision-making structures such as management councils
involve local stakeholders and meet on a regular basis. Local people take control over local
decisions and determine issues such as the use of local resources.18
There are many good examples of robust procedural justice. One example is frequent and
well-publicized city commission meetings that discuss environmental matters, held during nonworking hours. These meetings should provide ample time for public comment, and recordings of
these meetings, or their minutes, should be posted on public websites or video-streaming services.
In addition, informational pamphlets on environmental matters should be printed in languages other
than English if there are non-English speaking residents. City-wide alerts and announcements for
meetings should also be available in other languages if residents require them. Finally, procedural
justice requires governmental units or decision-making structures to meaningfully seek out and

16
17

““Learn About Environmental Justice,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

Jules N. Pretty, “Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture,” World Development 23, no. 8 (1995): 1247-1263, doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(95)00046-F.
18
Pretty, 1252.
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include all stakeholders into the policy process, especially in matters pertaining to human health,
such as drinking water quality.

B. THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
In 1982, African American civil rights leader Benjamin Chavis coined the term
“environmental racism.” Chavis was a key organizer during the Warren County protests. Under his
leadership at the United Church of Christ, the organization published its Toxic Waste and Race
report.19 There are some overarching theories as to what causes environmental racism. The Harvard
Environmental Law Review summarizes these theories into four categories: (1) the low political
power of affected communities, (2) intentional discrimination in siting, (3) unintentional
contribution of regulatory principles, and (4) unequal enforcement of environmental regulations.20
A community’s political capital plays a direct role in successfully opposing environmental
harm or creating environmentally forward local policies. Political power is a community’s ability to
participate in and directly influence the political process; thus, a community with low political power
will have less of an impact on this process. Some characteristics make some communities less
politically influential than others, such as a lower median income, a high percentage of residents who
do not have a high school diploma or are not employed, and low voter turn-out.21 In addition, low
political power easily leads to procedural justice concerns. There is less community knowledge of the
process and how to be involved with low political power, thus less interplay and engagement
between residents and their local government.

19

“A Movement is Born: Environmental Justice and the UCC,” United Church of Christ, accessed February 10, 2021,
https://www.ucc.org/what-we-do/justice-local-church-ministries/justice/faithful-action-ministries/environmentaljustice/a_movement_is_born_environmental_justice_and_the_ucc/.
20
Shea Diaz, “[ELRS] Getting to the Root of Environmental Justice,” Harvard Environmental Law Review, February 1,
2016, https://harvardelr.com/2016/02/01/elrs-getting-to-the-root-of-environmental-injustice/#_ftn13.
21
Diaz, “[ELRS] Getting to the Root of Environmental Justice.”
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Building off this theory is the intentional discrimination theory, which suggests that
corporations actively target these communities because of their lack of political power, money, and
other resources to resist environmental hazards. The existence of the Political Difficulties Facing Wasteto-Energy Conversion Plant Siting, a document produced for the California Waste Management Board in
1984 by consulting firm, Cerrell Associates, now referred to as the “Cerrell Report,” supports this
theory.22 This report articulates that middle- and higher-income groups have more resources to
resist environmental hazards, so waste managers should target lower-income communities that lack
these resources as they will likely be more successful.23 In addition, higher-income groups have more
political power and political knowledge of the process. They thus are better able to fight the siting of
environmental harms, a procedural justice component. With more environmental harms placed in
vulnerable communities, exposing them at a disproportionate rate to their effects, this becomes a
distributive justice issue as well.
The third theory that the Harvard Environmental Law Review puts forth is the unintentional
contribution towards environmental harms and injustices caused by ‘neutral’ regulatory policies.
Bugden (2020) describes this concept as a facet of color-blind environmental racism:
Color-blind environmental racism is rooted in color-blind racial ideology, masking and
legitimizing the racialized nature of environmental disadvantage through the belief that the
United States is a post-racial society… color-blind racial ideology reinforces environmental
racism by denying the legitimacy of environmental justice claims, reducing belief in the
structural racism that produces them, and lowering support for the types of policy necessary
to address environmental inequalities.24
These supposedly ‘neutral’ policies then contribute to both distributive and procedural injustices
against marginalized communities. For example, suppose a hazard is more prevalent in vulnerable

22
J. Stephen Powell, “Political Difficulties Facing Waste-to-Energy Conversion Plant Siting,” Cerrell Associates (1984),
available at http://www.ejnet.org/ej/cerrell.pdf.
23
Powell, 26.
24
Dylan Bugden, “Public Opinion and the Politics of Environmental Inequality: The Problem of Color-Blind
Environmental Racism,” Washington State University (September 15, 2020): 3, doi: 10.31235/osf.io/hg69c.
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communities, such as polluted air or poor water quality. In that case, the ‘neutral’ policies that
regulate those harms unintentionally contribute to environmental racism. For example, a majority
white congress passed the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 (S.D.W.A.) and did not include specific
anti-racist language. As a result, Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.) data from 2016-2019
reveals that water systems that constantly violate the S.D.W.A. are 40% more likely to serve people
of color and take longer to come back into compliance among communities of color.25 Neutral
policies created in a structurally racist system can create further barriers to engagement with the
political process for marginalized communities and expose them to a greater distribution of the
harms.
The final theory put forth states that environmental injustices stem from the unequal
enforcement of environmental regulations. Though the E.P.A. issues regulations that are to be
observed and enforced across the states equally, they are not disproportionately exposing vulnerable
populations to the harms caused. In one 1992 study conducted on the quality of the E.P.A.’s
enforcement of regulatory violations, it was noted that the agency discriminated against minority
communities, “with lower average penalties in federal enforcement of the Clean Water Act, by 28
percent, the Clean Air Act, by 8 percent, and the Safe Drinking Water Act, by 15 percent.”26
Another study highlights this trend through the notion of compliance bias or assuming that a
polluter is compliant with an environmental standard when they are not. This study found that the
likelihood of facility inspection increases with the percentage of employment in the surrounding
population, as higher rates of employment make a facility more “visible,” with visibility measured as

25

Daphne Ewing-Chow, “A Recent Survey Casts New Light On America’s Racial Divide In Clean Tap Water Access,”
Forbes, February 28, 2021, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/daphneewingchow/2021/02/28/a-recent-surveycasts-new-light-on-americas-racial-and-water-divide/?sh=79ce373421a6.
26
Marianne Lavell and Marcia Coyle, “Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law; A Special
Investigation,” The New Law Journal 15, no. 3 (September 21, 1992): 4, available at https://www.ejnet.org/ej/nlj.pdf.
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a facility’s importance to the local labor market.27 As mentioned above, areas of low employment
tend to have higher poverty rates and lower amounts of political power, supporting the claim that
environmental injustices stem from unequal enforcement of environmental regulations in
disadvantaged communities. As researcher Bullard notes, “the most polluted urban communities are
those with crumbling infrastructure, ongoing economic disinvestment, a high poverty rate, and an
overloaded health care system.”28

C. ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM & WATER
The E.P.A. regulates drinking water quality through the S.D.W.A. of 1974.29 The S.D.W.A.
operates through a cooperative federalism structure, which splits the responsibility of regulation
between the federal and state governments. The federal government, through the E.P.A., sets the
maximum contaminant levels (M.C.L.s) allowed in drinking water systems for over 90 potentially
harmful microorganisms, organic and inorganic chemicals, metals, and radionuclides.30 The E.P.A.
regulates a substance if it might have adverse health effects, there is a substantial likelihood that the
contaminant will occur in public water systems at a high enough level to be a concern to public
health, and that its regulation will reduce this potential risk. There are three types of public water
systems: community water systems (C.W.S.), non-transient non-community water systems
(NTNCWS), and transient non-community water systems (T.N.C.W.S.). C.W.S. is the only category
of public water systems that serve a community year-round consistently, and for that reason, it will

27
Catherine Dion, Paul Lanoie, and Benoit Laplante, “Monitoring of Pollution Regulation: Do Local Conditions
Matter?” Journal of Regulatory Economics 13, no. 1 (February 1998): 6, doi: 10.1023/A:1007970031068.
28
Robert D. Bullard, “Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement,” in Confronting
Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots (Boston: South End Press, 1993): 17.
29
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA): A Summary of the Act and
Its Major Requirements, by Elena H. Humpreys and Mary Tienmann, RL31243 (July 1, 2021),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL31243.pdf.
30
“Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, last updated July 2, 2021,
https://www.epa.gov/sdwa.
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be the focus of this analysis. 31 The maximum contaminant levels set should fall well below the
amount considered hazardous by the best available science. The responsibility is then placed upon
state governments, municipal water systems, and private companies to uphold the standard after
determining a limit.
Through the cooperative federalism structure, states may apply for “primacy,” which allows
the state government to be responsible for implementing the S.D.W.A. within their territory so long
as they can prove that they will meet the minimum standards set by the S.D.W.A., if not stricter
ones.32 Among other responsibilities, primacy status requires states to conduct sanitary surveys and
on-site inspections of the community water systems in the state. States also ensure the systems are
properly testing for contaminants, oversee system modifications, and act against systems that fail to
meet the established water quality standards.33 Currently, 49 states have the primacy power of their
water supplies. The only exclusions are the District of Columbia and Wyoming. 34 County and city
governments oversee community water systems, and they appropriate money for the cost of the
system and necessary updates. Thus, municipalities are the most impacted by federal policies.
There are several critiques of the standardized regulatory approach of the S.D.W.A. Each
system must test for all federally listed contaminants, even if they do not occur in their area and will
not pose a risk to the public. This can cost-burden systems that are already working with tight
budgets. On the converse, a standardized regulation may ignore potentially hazardous pollutants

31

“Information about Public Water Systems,” Drinking Water Requirements for States and Public Water Systems, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, last updated March 18, 2021, https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/information-aboutpublic-water-systems.
32
Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §300f et seq., 40 CFR §§142.10-142.19 (1976),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/40/part-142.
33

Safe Drinking Water Act, 40 CFR §§142.10-142.19.
“Public Water System Supervision (PWSS) Grant Program,” Drinking Water Requirements for States and Public
Water Systems, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, last updated April 9, 2021,
https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/public-water-system-supervision-pwss-grant-program.
34
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found in a local water system but are not one of the 90 regulated contaminants. Concerned
municipal systems must front the cost of monitoring these additional contaminants themselves. This
is especially concerning for low-income areas with more constricted budgets.
Despite its implementation in 1974, recent estimates on the effectiveness of the S.D.W.A.
reveal that between 1982 and 2015, 3 to 10% of the United States water systems have violated
federal Safe Drinking Water Act health standards.35 Though this may not seem a significant
percentage, in 2015 alone, that constituted 21 million Americans who had exposure to unsafe
drinking water.36 Another study reported that this level could be as high as 63 million Americans per
year.37 Additionally, a 2017 study conducted in collaboration with Texas A&M University found that
the probability of drinking water violations occurring is significantly greater in communities that are
low-income and predominantly non-white.38

D. DRINKING WATER IN MICHIGAN
As the current poster child and epicenter for drinking water reform, Flint, Michigan presents
an interesting case study for environmental justice. In 2014, approximately 60 miles northwest of
Detroit, Flint made international headlines when residents discovered high levels of lead in their
water after a recent water source switch. After decades of decline, disinvestment, and industry loss,
Flint entered state-mandated control from 2002 until 2004.39 The city fought this decision in court
but lost three months later. As a result of the takeover, the state-appointed an emergency manager to

35

Maura Allaire, Haowei Wu, and Upmanu Lall, “National Trends in Drinking Water Quality Violations,” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 115, no. 9 (February 12, 2018): 2078, doi:
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1719805115.
36
Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2079.
37
Agnel Philip et al., “Millions consumed potentially unsafe water in the last 10 years,” in Troubled Water, News21,
August 14, 2017, https://troubledwater.news21.com/millions-consumed-potentially-unsafe-water-in-the-last-10-years/.
38
David Switzer and Manuel P. Teodoro, “Class, Race, Ethnicity, and Justice in Safe Drinking Water Compliance,”
Social Science Quarterly 99, no. 2 (March 23, 2017): 524-535, doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12397.
39
Beata Mostafavi, “What happened last time? A look back at Flint’s 2002 state takeover,” MLive, updated January 21,
2019, https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/2011/11/what_happened_last_time_a_look.html.
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cut the city’s spending bill and bring it out of financial emergency. As a result, employees of the
cities and union members took pay cuts or lost their jobs, sewers and roads received $1 million for
infrastructure improvements, and household water bills rose 11%.40
The takeover concluded in 2004, but state oversight remained until 2006. In 2011,
Michigan’s State Financial Review Ream declared the city under financial emergency again and
suggested that Flint goes under the control of another emergency manager. In 2013, under
emergency management, the city of Flint switched from the Detroit Water and Sewage Department
(D.W.S.D.), which they had been connected to since the 1960s, to the Karengnondi Water
Authority, which began construction in the same year. The new project would save the city $200
million over 25 years.41 In the interim, the city used the Flint River for its water supply. The Flint
River was once the city’s main water source until the 1960s when they switched to the D.W.S.D. In
2014, when the switch officially happened, officials decided not to treat the water to inhibit
corrosion immediately. Over the next year and a half, Flint residents experienced high lead levels
from the corrosion of the old pipes caused by the untreated water and E. coli, total coliform
bacteria, and total trihalomethanes (or T.T.H.M.). This disinfection byproduct can be carcinogenic.
The levels of lead and T.T.H.M. in the water put the city in violation of the S.D.W.A. Despite
growing concern and research on the levels of lead exposure in the residents of Flint, the city did not
switch their water supply back to the D.W.S.D. until October of 2015.
Despite national attention and the state government’s intervention the city has received over
the last decade, Flint still has one of the highest poverty rates in the nation. According to 2016 U.S.
Census Bureau data, Flint has the highest poverty rate among U.S. cities, with 65,000 residents with

40

Mostafavi, “What happened last time?”
Merrit Kennedy, “Lead-Laced Water In Flint: A Step-By-Step Look At The Makings Of A Crisis,” National Public
Radio, April 20, 2016, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/20/465545378/lead-laced-water-in-flint-astep-by-step-look-at-the-makings-of-a-crisis.
41
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45% of residents living below the poverty line.42 In addition, it also has one of the highest rates of
childhood poverty at 58%. The national rate is only 18%.43
In response to the Flint water crisis, the Michigan Legislature passed Lead and Copper Rule
revisions in 2018. These revisions enforced a stricter Action Level on lead from 15 ppb to 12 ppb by
January 1, 2025, increased sampling requirements, more frequent testing for water systems that
exceed the Action Level, or use corrosion control treatments. Water supplies are also required to
replace all lead service lines incrementally each year, with an annual replacement rate of 5%.44
Unfortunately, Flint, Michigan is not an isolated incident. In a 2016 to 2019 collaborative study
of nationwide violations of the S.D.W.A., race, ethnicity, and language were cited as the strongest
indicators of inadequate or slow enforcement.45 Flint was an example of the cumulative effects that
housing segregation, community disinvestment, and discriminatory political processes and policies
can have on the livelihood and public health of the communities living within its borders. Due to the
widespread attention and spotlight that Flint has shown upon the need for drinking water and
infrastructure reform at the city level, many reports, analyses, and further studies attempt to explain
the core of environmental racism and change the discourse of environmental justice going forward.

42

Leonidas Murembya, PhD and Eric Guthrie, Demographic and Labor Market Profile: City of Flint, Department of
Technology, Management and Budget (April 2016): 13,
https://milmi.org/_docs/publications/Flint_City_Demographic_and_Labor_Mkt_Profile.pdf.
43
“An Urgent and Preventable Crisis,” Children’s Defense Fund, accessed February 15, 2021,
https://www.childrensdefense.org/policy/resources/soac-2020-child-poverty/.
44
What Changed With Michigan’s 2018 Lead and Copper Rule?, University of Michigan and Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation, April 19, 2019, http://graham.umich.edu/media/files/Lead-and-Copper-Rule-Info-Brochure-LTR042319.pdf.
45
Kristi Pullen Fedinick and Steve Taylor, Watered Down Justice, National Resource Defense Council, March 27, 2020,
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN
A. METHODS
The central tenant of this analysis was to understand how distributive and procedural
characteristics of a city contributed to its ability to provide safe drinking water to its residents.
Compliance with the federal Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 and Michigan’s Lead and Copper
Rule determined drinking water quality. Compliance with these regulations provided a baseline
standard for E.J. at the municipal level. From there, four evaluative criteria worked to understand
the status of E.J. in each city. These criteria were: (1) housing tenure, (2) infrastructure capability, (3)
public participation, and (4) emergency management. Housing tenure and infrastructure capability
examined the distributive justice components of E.J. They convey the geographic concentration of
issues related to water quality and access to clean water. Public participation and emergency
management explored the procedural justice components of E.J. and how government proceedings
influenced the public’s meaningful involvement in the policy process.
Housing tenure addresses homeownership versus home renter rates and the demographics
of owners and renters in each city. The American Community Survey from 2019 and the 2020 U.S.
Census provided data on housing tenure. Infrastructure capability examines the age, size, and service
line composition of each city’s distribution system. Consumer Confidence Reports (C.C.R.),
municipal websites, phone calls with municipal water plant supervisors and the Distribution System
Materials Inventory (D.S.M.I.), a self-reported inventory of service line composition in each city that
is a part of Michigan’s Lead and Copper Rule new 2018 mandates, supplied data on the
infrastructure of each city. Consumer Confidence Reports also referred to as water quality reports,
are provided by community water suppliers and give customers information on the quality of their
drinking water annually. Public participation considered three key factors of “interactive
participation” from Pretty: the availably of drinking water quality information, public access to
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decision-making structures, and government transparency. Data in this section came from municipal
websites, C.C.R., and phone calls with water plant supervisors. Finally, the emergency management
section sought to understand the influence of state control on E.J. during an economic emergency in
a city. This was a key aspect of the literature following the Flint Water Crisis. Information from local
news stories, municipal websites, and Michigan’s Department of Treasury database for emergency
management presented a detailed history of state financial intervention in the applicable cities. Data
gathered from these sources was then compared with theories on environmental racism and
analyzed to understand a city’s ability to provide safe drinking water to its residents through its
procedural and distributive structures.
Due to the restraints of COVID-19, this study used only online-available resources. Using
only online resources was representative of what information was available to the public on their
water quality during a global pandemic and the growing trend of Americans receiving their news and
information from online resources. Approximately 77% of U.S. adults stated that the Internet was
important to get their local news information.46 Data was also restricted to cities as the geographical
unit of analysis due to the cooperative federalism structure of the S.D.W.A. of 1974 and the costresponsibility it places on municipalities to fund their drinking water systems.

B. CITY SELECTION & BACKGROUND
This study utilized the P.E.W. Research Center median income categories for Michigan of
lower ($26,290), middle ($79,042), and upper ($183,375).47 From this baseline, cities were then
categorized based on their main drinking water source. Community water systems (C.W.S.) are the

46

A.W. Geiger, “Key findings about the online news landscape in America,” Pew Research Center, September 11, 2019,
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/11/key-findings-about-the-online-news-landscape-in-america/.
47
Jake Frankenfield, “Which Income Class Are You?” Investopedia, updated April 25, 2021,
https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0912/which-income-class-are-you.aspx.
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infrastructure that supplies water to the same population year-round.48 C.W.S. can extract their
supplies through a few methods, but this analysis only included C.W.S. that rely on surface water
extraction methods. Cities in each income bracket that relied on surface water extraction were then
selected based upon their predominant racial demographics and water extraction source from one of
the five Great Lakes, which resulted in analysis of four cities: Birmingham, Flint, Benton Harbor,
and St. Joseph. Two of the cities, Birmingham and St. Joseph, have predominantly white
populations. The other two cities, Flint and Benton Harbor, have predominantly Black or African
American populations.
Birmingham is a suburb city located approximately 20 miles north of downtown Detroit in
the southeastern portion of Oakland County, one of the wealthiest counties in the country.
According to the city’s website, Birmingham’s downtown dates to the 1830s. However, the city was
not incorporated until 1933 and experienced a surge in residents during the urban sprawl and white
flight out of Detroit in the 1950s.49 Birmingham is a pedestrian-friendly city with a large amount of
retail space and over 230 acres of parks. Birmingham falls into the upper-income bracket and
receives its drinking water supply through surface water extraction of Lake Huron and the Detroit
River. Birmingham obtains this water through the Great Lakes Water Authority’s Northeast Water
Treatment Plant. In 2019, Birmingham had a population of 21,389, and its median household
income was $122,804. Birmingham’s population is majority white, at 79.1%, 7.5% is Asian, 7.2%
Black or African American, and 2.6% Hispanic or Latino.50
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“Information about Public Water Systems,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
“The History of Birmingham,” City of Birmingham, accessed March 15, 2021,
https://www.bhamgov.org/history/history.php.
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U.S. Census Bureau, “Population estimates for Birmingham city, Michigan; Flint city, Michigan; Benton Harbor city,
Michigan; St. Joseph city, Michigan; United States,” Quickfacts, July 1, 2019, accessed January 6, 2022,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/stjosephcitymichigan,birminghamcitymichigan,flintcitymichigan,benton
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Flint, 49 miles north of Birmingham, was incorporated in 1855. Flint’s history is best
characterized by the presence of General Motors in the city after its founding in 1908 and the auto
company’s integral role as the city’s economic base until the 1980s when G.M. left Flint.51 Economic
disinvestment began in the city in the 1940s when G.M. began investing in suburbs and rural areas,
building eight new industrial complexes in the Flint metropolitan area. This move served a blow to
the city’s tax base. Additionally, it caused an exodus of white workers with the mobility to move to
the suburbs, leaving behind Black and lower-income populations that could not afford to move or
did not have the social ability to do so due to discriminatory housing practices. Flint, as a result, has
suffered a trend of continued economic disinvestment, infrastructure failure, and unemployment.
The city falls into the lower-income bracket with a median household income of $28,834 and in
2019, had a population of 95,538. Flint’s population is 54.1% Black or African American, 36.9%
white, 4.5% Hispanic or Latino, and only .5% Asian.52 Like Birmingham, Flint receives its drinking
water supply from the Great Lakes Water Authority but receives treated water through the Lake
Huron Water Treatment Plant. As a result, Birmingham and Flint provided an analysis on water
equity within the same water system for two areas that are economically and demographically very
diverse.
On the southwestern side of the state, St. Joseph sits at the mouth of the St. Joseph River
and Lake Michigan. Incorporated as a city in 1891, St. Joseph has a rich history of trade and
shipping between the major cities of Detroit, Chicago, and Mackinac.53 In 1911, a small business
that in 35 years would become the Whirlpool Corporation opened in the city. Today, Whirlpool

51
“The Birthplace of General Motors,” General Motors, accessed February 12, 2021, https://www.gm.com/ourstories/community/general-motors-birthplace.html.
52
U.S. Census Bureau, “Population Estimates.”
53
“A Little About St. Joseph,” WNIT Michigan, accessed March 15, 2021,
https://www.wnit.org/ourtown/e/stjoseph.html.
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Corporation is one of the largest manufacturers of home appliances, and its presence is still strong in
the community. St. Joseph has a population of 8,317, a median income of $62,374, and a poverty
rate of 7%. St. Joseph has a population that is 82.5% white, 6.4% Asian, 4.9% Black or African
American, and 2.3% Hispanic or Latino.54 The city extracts its drinking water supply via surface
extraction from Lake Michigan. It processes it in the St. Joseph Water Treatment Plant. This cityowned facility services St. Joseph and some surrounding charter townships, making up the Water
Services Joint Operating Board (W.S.J.O.B.).
Just across the St. Joseph River is the city of Benton Harbor. Benton Harbor was once a
hotspot for industry and shipping in Michigan’s fruit belt with access to the St. Joseph River and
proximity to Lake Michigan. The mouth of the St. Joseph River was a key water route between the
Great Lakes and the Mississippi River, making the area an important point of travel and commerce
in early American history. Today, Benton Harbor and the other surrounding areas in Berrien County
are one of the most productive fruit-growing climate regions globally.55 Despite the continued
viability of the land, much of the industry and employment positions in Benton Harbor long left the
area, leaving behind economic depression, high rates of unemployment, and the deterioration of
infrastructure. One industry that has remained is the Whirlpool Corporation, whose world
headquarters is located just outside of the Benton Harbor city limits. Benton Harbor has a
population of 9,741 and falls into the lower-income bracket with a median household income of
$21,916 and a staggering 45.4% poverty rate.56 Benton Harbor has a predominantly Black or African
American population that makes up 84.7% of the total population, with whites making up 9.5% and
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Hispanics or Latinos at 5.4%.57 Benton Harbor also extracts its drinking water supply through
surface water extraction of Lake Michigan through the Benton Harbor Charter Township Water
Plant. As a result, Benton Harbor provided a spatially and geographically different comparison
juxtaposed with Flint. Both cities extract from surface water from two Great Lakes and have
comparable income and racial demographics. Including Benton Harbor and St. Joseph compared
city-level drinking water quality in areas of differing racial composition and economic levels. Unlike
the Birmingham and Flint comparison, these two cities analyzed systems that extracted from the
same source but through independent, city-owned water plants.

TABLE 1 – Demographics by City

Demographics by City - U.S. Census Bureau
Demographics

Birmingham

Flint

Benton Harbor

St. Joseph

Population

21,389

95,538

9,741

8,317

Median Household Income

$122,804

$28,834

$21,916

$62,374

Poverty Rate

5.30%

38.80%

45.40%

7.00%

Black or African American

3.40%

54.10%

84.70%

4.90%

White

87.80%

36.90%

9.50%

82.50%

Asian

3.80%

0.50%

0.00%

4.90%

Hispanic or Latinx

2.50%

4.50%

5.40%

2.30%

Source: Data from U.S. Census Bureau, “Population estimates for Birmingham city, Michigan; Flint city, Michigan;
Benton Harbor city, Michigan; St. Joseph city, Michigan; United States,” Quickfacts, July 1, 2019, accessed January 6,
2021, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table.

57

See note 56.
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IV. FINDINGS
A. STATUS OF COMPLIANCE
First, overall compliance with federal and state drinking water regulations provided an
overview of how the themes of environmental racism played out in the selected cities. Flint and
Benton Harbor were in violation, with Benton Harbor having lead levels that far exceeded federal
and state standards. On the other hand, Birmingham and St. Joseph complied with water quality
testing far below the maximum contaminant levels allowed.
Flint’s violation was a failure to accurately gather the correct number of viable samples to
report on lead and copper levels per Michigan’s Lead and Copper Rule, a continuation of a 2019
sampling violation. Per the specifications of the rule, cities must collect samples from at least 60
sites. Though Flint collected samples from 123 sites in 2019 for the July 2019 to December 2019
monitoring period and 116 sites for January 2020 to June 2020 monitoring period, the E.P.A.
validated only 49 samples from both periods. Despite this, both periods were still below the 90th
percentile Action Level (A.L.) for lead at four parts per billion (ppb). Therefore, Flint must submit at
least 60 validated samples for the next six-month monitoring period to return to compliance.
For the 2020 monitoring period, Benton Harbor received 6 S.D.W.A. violations. Since 2015,
sites in Benton Harbor have tested above the Action Level (A.L.) for lead. In 2015, two sites tested
above the A.L., and these levels were reported again in more sites in September 2018, 12 sites in
June 2019, 10 sites in December 2019, 9 sites in June 2020 and 11 sites December 2020.
Unfortunately, the specific number of sites above A.L. for lead in 2018 doesn’t exist publicly
because the C.C.R. is not posted publicly on the Benton Harbor municipal website.
In addition, Benton Harbor failed to provide the necessary Public Education materials
mandated by the S.D.W.A. about the Action Level Exceedance to all consumers in the city following
the two consecutive exceedances in December 2019 and June 2020. The city also failed to collect
23

proper samples for regulated substances Synthetic Organic Chemicals for two monitoring periods
and P.F.A.S. for one monitoring period. The other two violations stem from treatment equipment
failure of the chlorine monitoring system, not correctly reported to E.G.L.E., and a lack of
aluminum sulfate. This essential treatment chemical eliminated microbial contamination in water
supplies and triggered a precautionary boil water advisory. The city has since returned to compliance
on these last 2twomonitoring discrepancies.

B. DISTRIBUTIVE FACTORS
i.

HOUSING TENURE

Housing tenure exacerbates the distribution of environmental harms. Cities in this study
with high homeownership rates (see Table 2) appear to have had fewer drinking water violations,
both historically and in the 2020 water quality data. For example, 66.2% of the population owns
their home in Birmingham, 93.3% are white. Despite making up 7.2% of the city’s total population,
African American or Black individuals only account for 1.1% of homeowners, but 11.2% of total
home renters. A similar disparity occurs in the Hispanic or Latinx demographic, consisting of 2.6%
of the total population in Birmingham, at only .95% of homeowners and 4.9% of all home renters.
This trend is replicated again in St. Joseph, where the homeownership rate is approximately 52%, of
which 92.6% are white and with a higher concentration of non-whites renting their homes rather
than owning them.
Flint and Benton Harbor have lower rates of homeownership overall. In Flint, 43% of the
population are homeowners and 32% are renters. Of those who own homes, the percentage of
white to Black or African American homeowners is similar, 47.1% to 46.6% respectively, despite
white people making up only 36.9% of the total population. Flint, whose population is 54.1% Black,
has a higher ratio of Black renters at 62.9% than Black homeowners, at 46.6%.
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Benton Harbor is the only city in this analysis with a higher rate of total renters, at 54%, than
homeowners, at 31%. As another predominately Black populated city, with 84.7% of the total
population, only 77.2% of all homeowners are Black while 86.7% of all home renters are Black.

TABLE 2 – Housing Tenure by Ownership

Housing Tenure - American Community Survey (2019)
Housing Tenure

Birmingham

Flint

Benton Harbor

St. Joseph

Owner Occupied

6,768

22,965

1,515

2,471

Renter Occupied

2,363

17,397

2,628

1,588

Vacant

1,099

13,682

717

707

Total Housing Units

10,230

54,044

4,860

4,766

Source: American Community Survey, “Selected Housing Characteristics, 2019: A.C.S. 1-Year Estimates Tables,” U.S.
Census Bureau, 2019, Accessed January 8, 2021,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=vacant&tid=ACSDP1Y2019.DP04.

TABLE 3 – Housing Tenure by Race
Housing Tenure by Race - American Community Survey (2019)
Birmingham

Flint

Benton Harbor

St. Joseph

Housing Tenure

Owner

Renter

Owner

Renter

Owner

Renter

Owner

Renter

African American or Black

1.10%

11.20%

46.60%

62.90%

77.20%

86.70%

0.50%

8.10%

Asian

4.50%

1.90%

N

N

0.00%

0.00%

3.20%

9.00%

Hispanic or Latinx

0.95%

4.90%

2.90%

3.60%

3.00%

4.90%

1.00%

6.20%

White

93.30%

79.60%

47.10%

31.30%

15.20%

7.50%

92.60%

75.40%

Source: Data from American Community Survey, “Demographic Characteristics for Occupied Housing Units, 2019: ACS 1-Year
Estimates Tables,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2019, Accessed January 8, 2021,
Overall, this presents a compelling trend that homeownership rates in comparison to renter
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=tenure%20&tid=ACSST1Y2019.S2502.

rates by demographic increase for white people living in majority-Black cities and decrease for Black
people living in majority-white cities. Meaning that white people in black cities are more likely to
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own a home than black people are in white cities. In all four cities, however, Hispanic or Latinx
individuals consistently had a higher ration of renters than owners, regardless of the overall majority
population.
ii.

INFRASTRUCTURE CAPABILITY

There does not appear to be a correlation between the age, size and service line composition
of the infrastructure and its ability to provide clean drinking water. Lead service lines are also not
more prevalent in vulnerable communities. St. Joseph has the oldest water treatment facility and
distribution system of the four cities, with the original plant built-in 1931. It has undergone major
expansion in 1957, 1974 with new building additions added in 2011 and 2020. Benton Harbor
gained municipal control of its water system in the 1950s and underwent a major renovation in 2013
to address the aging and failure of its system. Birmingham does not have its own city-owned water
treatment plant and relies on the Great Lakes Water Authority to provide treated water through its
Northeast Treatment Plant. The Northeast Plant was originally constructed in 1956 to address the
needs of suburban communities outside of Detroit. Flint’s water treatment plant was originally
constructed in 1952 and underwent major renovations in 2014. However, as a direct result of the
Flint Water Crisis in 2015, the city no longer directly treats its water. Instead, it relies on the Great
Lakes Water Authority to extract, pump and treat the water through the Lake Huron Water
Treatment Plant, which began full-scale operation in 1974. The city’s plant then treats the water with
additional corrosion control treatments, per the needs of the local supply system. Additionally, due
to the crisis, the city is undergoing a massive infrastructure update on its distribution system through
loans provided by the state and federal governments.58 Some of the upgrades included are a $97

58

“Flint Drinking Water Contracts as of February 28, 2019,” Department of Environment, Great Lakes, & Energy,
February 28, 2019, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/flintwater/Flint_Contracts_022819_648033_7.pdf.

26

million initiative to replace all the lead service lines, $11 million to upgrade household water meters,
and another $5.1 million to construct a new chemical feed building.59
According to preliminary D.S.M.I. estimates in Table 2, the size of the system and the
presence of lead service lines do not appear to be a direct factor to environmental justice concerns in
clean drinking water accessibility. Based on these self-reported city estimates, the city-systems ranked
from smallest to largest are St. Joseph, Benton Harbor, Birmingham, and Flint. Flint currently
estimates that no lead service lines remain in the distribution system despite having the largest
system due to recent infrastructure upgrades. Unfortunately, information on lead levels before the
2014 switch to the Flint River, and subsequent infrastructure upgrades following the ensuing crisis,
are not available because the city’s 2013 C.C.R. doesn’t exist in an electronic format. Thus, a
comparison of lead levels before the city’s switch and after completing the upgrades is unavailable
for reference.

59

“Infrastructure Improvement Projects,” City of Flint, accessed March 15, 2021,
https://www.cityofflint.com/ongoing-projects-summaries/.
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TABLE 4 – Service Line Type by City

Service Line Type by City - DSMI December 2020 Estimations
Service Line Type

Birmingham

Flint

Benton Harbor

St. Joseph

Known Lead

731

0

824

106

Known Galvanized
Previously Connected to
Lead (GPCL)

0

0

571

5

Unknown - Likely Lead

0

0

1,616

2,457

Unknown - No
Information

0

4,665

2,733

825

Unknown - Likely Not
Lead

0

0

0

0

No Lead or GPCL

7,248

24,594

133

482

Total Service Lines

7,979

29,259

5,877

3,875

Source: Data from Department of Environmental, Great Lakes, & Energy, Michigan Service Line Materials Estimates
Preliminary Distribution System Materials Inventories, updated December, 2020, accessed June 6, 2021,
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/egle/egle-dwehd-PDSMISummaryData_682673_7.pdf.

St. Joseph has the smallest distribution system with the greatest ratio of lead service lines
remaining. As of December 2020, when the Preliminary Distribution System Material Inventory was
last updated, 66% of St. Joseph’s service lines were known lead, known galvanized previously
connected to lead, or unknown but likely lead. Despite this, only one of the 60 samples that the city
must submit to the E.P.A. tested above Action Level with 90% of samples testing at or below nine
ppb., well below the 15ppb mandate. Benton Harbor, the second smallest system, has 51% of its
service lines listed as known lead, known galvanized previously connected to lead, or unknown but
likely lead. Despite this lower ratio, Benton Harbor has consistently had sites in Action Level
Exceedance for the last five years, as mentioned prior, with 90% of samples reporting lead levels at
or below 24ppb from July to December of 2020. Birmingham, the second-largest system, has only
9% of its service lines known to be lead and 91% known not to be lead or galvanized and previously
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connected to lead. From 2015-2019, Birmingham did not report any sites testing above Action Level
and only in 2020 found eight sites in Action Level Exceedance with 90% of samples testing at 8ppb.
The cause for this recent spike is unknown based on data pulled from the 2020 C.C.R.
Although the age, size and composition of drinking water systems did not reveal
environmental justice trends, and underinvestment in updating and maintaining this infrastructure
may be a source of distributive injustice. Flint’s lack of funding for its distribution system caused the
Flint Water Crisis, as discussed in subsequent sections. Flint’s current system is now the epitome of
infrastructure investment for long-term drinking water quality and protecting vulnerable
populations. St. Joseph, however, has managed to maintain compliance with drinking water
regulations and provide safe drinking water to its residents, despite continuing to have a high ratio of
lead, or possible lead, service lines in its system. A cause of this chronic underinvestment could be
the lack of a wealthy tax base to pay into the city plant’s services and provide adequate funding.
Other ideas suggest that such endeavors cannot keep up with a rapidly expanding population due to
funding. It is the consequence of political disagreement on how to fund such projects.

A. PROCEDURAL FACTORS
i.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Birmingham has an outside portal service through Aquahawk that allows customers to
monitor their monthly usage, control monthly water bills by estimated water consumption or cost
and receive important alerts about system leaks to increase public access to water quality and usage
information.60 This free service provided by the city allows customers to better understand their
monthly water expenses and control their usage to keep water bills from becoming too costly for
them to pay. Birmingham also has a voluntary city-wide email notification system to enhance

60

See the City of Birmingham’s Aquahawk Alerting Customer Portal, 2021: https://birmmi.aquahawk.us/login.
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communication between the city’s government and its residents. According to Birmingham’s
website, this system recognizes “the value of communicating openly and often with its residents”
and after residents indicated “that frequent communication is important to them.”61 The service
provides transparency on what is happening in town, advance notice on issues that affect the
community, such as water quality issues or other emergencies, and target messages to specific city
areas. No other city involved in this analysis provides a similar direct communication service with its
residents. The email alerts provide more accurate and timely information directly to Birmingham
residents and improve their access to the decision-making process by sending notifications of
upcoming city council meetings. In addition to these services, Birmingham also has a monthly enewsletter, called Around Town, sent to residents via email and alerts them on the latest events,
construction projects, and city programs.
Birmingham maintains an updated web page of all city commission meetings and agendas to
create better public access to the decision-making process, dating back to 2013. This encourages
residents to attend regular bi-monthly meetings, scheduled to occur every other Monday at 7:30 p.m.
Meetings at this hour allow most individuals who work during normal business hours to attend. City
commission meetings are uploaded to the city’s Vimeo and YouTube channels if residents cannot
join. Birmingham has decided to continue offering residents a virtual option to attend via Zoom
despite returning to in-person meetings. One public access concern was the lack of return
communication with the water plant when called. The Water, Sewer, and Street Foreman was called
twice, on June 28 and July 12, and left messages both times. Despite this, the foreman never called
back.

61 “Social Media: Citywide Email Signup,” City of Birmingham, accessed March 16, 2021,
https://www.bhamgov.org/contact_us/citywide_email_signup.php.
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St. Joseph, instead of an email alert system, has a Public Hub on its website.62 This Public
Hub includes important announcements, audit reports, local charters, ordinances and policies, job
postings, public notices, press releases, and a performance dashboard, among other features. The
performance dashboard was created to provide better government transparency to St. Joseph
residents and includes financial and operating benchmarks relevant to the city’s ongoing goal and
objectives, such as water infrastructure updates, the average age of critical infrastructure, and the
overall expense of utilities.63
To create better access to the decision-making process, specifically for water quality matters,
the city has extended an invitation to residents to join the Water Services Joint Operating board
meetings that occur once a month at 4:00 p.m. on each C.C.R. until 2020. It is unclear why the 2020
C.C.R. didn’t include this information. The timing of this meeting also presents a concern, as
residents who work normal business hours either would not be able to attend or would have to miss
work to attend. If residents do miss the meeting, St. Joseph maintains a website specifically for the
minutes and notices of all meeting groups, who is in each group, their contact information, and the
meeting frequency.64 Unlike Birmingham, St. Joseph does not upload a video or audio version of
their meetings for residents to watch, restricting access to individuals who may not understand the
webpage or cannot read well. Often these characteristics pertain to older individuals or people
already marginalized by lack of education. The St. Joseph water treatment plant supervisor was the
only individual to answer the first call to the plant and answer all questions asked of the system.
When the supervisor could not provide this information, they could indicate other St. Joseph

“Public Hub,” City of St. Joseph, accessed March 18, 2021, https://www.sjcity.com/public-hub#governmenttransparency.
63
“Municipal Performance Dashboard,” City of St. Joseph, 2021,
https://bsaonline.com/MunicipalDashboard/Performance?uid=976.
64
“Water Services Operating Board,” City of St. Joseph, accessed May 20, 2021,
http://stjosephcitymi.iqm2.com/Citizens/Default.aspx.
62
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employees who would be best suited to answer specific questions on the system and provided
contact information. In providing the public with water quality information, St. Joseph and their
staff were the most timely, helpful, and comprehensive of the four cities.
Flint’s public participation in the decision-making process, government transparency and
information provided to the public on drinking water concerns all drastically improved following
2015. Today, Flint has two water advisory committees: (1) a Technical Committee with members
from the E.P.A., E.G.L.E., health coalitions, departments and hospitals, and City of Flint employees
and (2) a Citizens Advisory Committee with members of neighborhood associations, religious
groups, local universities, businesses, landlord associations, representatives of state politicians, and
county government officials. The 2018 L.C.R. revisions require city water councils for systems with
greater than 50,000 consumers to form these advisory committees. These committees allow
technical and public stakeholder interests input in all major water policy decisions for the city,
increasing the direct access to the decision-making process on water issues. The city’s website and
annual C.C.R. announce city council meetings which occur on the first and third Wednesday of each
month at 5 p.m. This later time may allow working individuals to attend if they can get out of work
on time. If they are not, Flint also posts all meeting notices, agendas, and minutes in a timely fashion
to their website and maintains a YouTube channel recording all meetings. The Flint website also
contains a specific webpage devoted to the progress of Flint water quality. This includes an overview
of infrastructure improvements and anticipated deadlines, information on the Flint Registry, a
supportive service for those directly affected by the Flint Water Crisis. The webpage also has an
interactive map of all the service lines in Flint and includes an invitation to the public to provide
comments on water issues via email or mail.65

65

“Progress Report on Flint Water: Secondary Water Pipeline,” City of Flint, accessed May 20, 2021,
https://www.cityofflint.com/progress-report-on-flint-water-secondary-water-pipeline/.
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Additionally, Flint has provided information on per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)
on their C.C.R.s since 2017. P.F.A.S. are synthetically created chemicals, often called “forever
chemicals” because they never fully degrade. Though the E.P.A. has not issued S.D.W.A. regulations
for P.F.A.S., the next round of the federally mandated Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring Rule,
U.C.M.R. 5, will include P.F.A.S. sampling. This testing will determine if their levels in C.W.S.
suggest regulating the contaminant. According to the E.P.A., P.F.A.S. contaminates have been
linked to reproductive and developmental problems, liver and kidney failure and immunological
effects.66 Flint has surpassed federal mandates by including information, warnings, and suggestions
on minimizing P.F.A.S. exposure and provided their residents with more transparent and
comprehensive contaminant information about their drinking water. This is an important step that
Flint has taken to ensure environmental justice for all its residents, most of whom are marginalized.
Though Flint’s water plant supervisor did not return an initial phone call made on June 28, which
could access the process concern, they did respond to general questions about the water distribution
system and plant over the phone on August 2.
Benton Harbor appears to have the least amount of publicly available information,
government transparency, and access to decision-making compared to the other three cities. The city
does announce on the front page of their C.C.R.s an invitation for public participation at their city
commission meetings, held on the first and third Monday of each month at 7:00 p.m., an ideal time
for many working individuals. If someone cannot attend, these meetings are recorded and posted on
the city’s YouTube page. However, meeting agendas and notices are not available online, though
they have a specified webpage. Despite this, the city does a thorough job of clearly posting all city
committee meetings times, days, and locations, with all meetings occurring after 5:30 p.m. and
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contact information for city commissioners. Another glaring transparency concern is the lack of
access to Benton Harbor’s 2018 C.C.R. This report doesn’t exist on the city’s municipal website.
This violates E.G.L.E.’s mandates for city water quality reporting per §325.1014 of Michigan’s
S.D.W.A. of 1976, requiring annual C.C.R.s to be available on the Internet.67 The inaccessibility of
this report presents a transparency issue for the residents of Benton Harbor, especially since the city
reported Action Level Exceedance for lead during this period. However, in 2020, the director of
Benton Harbor’s Public Works division indicated the department’s plan to use Every Door Direct
Mailing, a U.S. Postal Service program that will allow it to canvas the entire city at a significantly
lower postage cost.68 The status of this initiative is unknown.
Additionally, the number listed on Benton Harbor’s website for their Water Plant Director
does not work and does not leave an option to leave a voicemail. An alternative number was found
for the water plant and called on June 28, but the supervisor on duty chose to have the questions
emailed rather than answer them over the phone. The supervisor did not follow-up, despite multiple
attempts. These gaps in available online information pose a procedural environmental justice
concern for the residents of Benton Harbor. The lack of online information diminishes government
transparency through the website and a lack of return communication from city officials on general
facts about the drinking water system.
All cities in this analysis must engage in ‘good faith’ efforts to reach their customers to provide
C.C.R.s and disseminate violation notices, per S.D.W.A. standards for Michigan. Good faith efforts
require cities to attempt to contact all customers, regardless of homeownership status. In addition,
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administrative Rule 325.10415 lays out guidelines on how community water systems may engage in
good faith efforts which may include a mix of any of the following methods:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Posting the report on the Internet
Mailing to postal patrons in metropolitan areas
Advertising the availability of the report in the news media
Publication in a local newspaper
Posting in public places such as cafeterias or lunchrooms of public buildings
Delivery of multiple copies for distribution by single biller customers such as apartment
buildings or large private employers
(g) Delivery to community organizations.69
Though this is an extensive list of possible communication efforts, a good faith requirement
only mandates that city governments conduct themselves with “an honest belief, the absence of
malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.”70 This can be
a difficult standard to challenge legally, especially for home renters. In addition, good faith efforts
have no bright-line test if renters feel that the local government units or their landlords have not
provided adequate notice of drinking water quality or violations. This leaves ample room for varying
interpretations on what ‘good faith’ actions should entail. This room for subjectivity creates
hindrances to the public participation process and a pathway for environmental injustices to occur.
ii.

INTERVENTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGERS

Emergency financial managers have existed in Michigan cities since 1988 with the passing of
Public Act 101 which provided certain triggers for an initial review of a city’s finances and the
appointment of an emergency financial manager. Some triggers include a failure to pay debts or
employee salaries, requests for review by residents or local officials, or an initiation by members of
the State Senate, State House, or State Treasurer. The governor ultimately selects the E.M. with
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approval from the state treasurer. In 2011, emergency managers received strengthened powers and
can now strip locally elected government officials of their power. According to a former E.M. from
Benton Harbor, “’ the only authority that they [local governments] can have is the authority that’s
provided to them or is given to them by the emergency manager.”71
Local governments retain some of their power through the most recent version of the law,
PA 436. PA 436 allows local officials to select between four state interventions: a consent
agreement, bankruptcy, mediation, or the appointment of an emergency manager. If an E.M. is
appointed and creates a financial plan, the local government can propose an alternative plan to state
officials who will ultimately decide. Most importantly, PA 436 allows a local government the power
to remove an E.M. after one year through a 2/3 majority vote and requires that the state
government pay the salary of the E.M., not the municipality. Despite this increased municipal power,
E.M.s exercise a great deal of control over the lives of city residents with very small limits to their
power. The cities currently in non-compliance for 2020, Benton Harbor and Flint have a history
with state-mandated emergency management (see Table 5). Benton Harbor first was appointed an
E.M. in April of 2010. After a preliminary review conducted by the state, the city couldn’t pay nearly
$4 million to its pension systems, failing to file timely annual financial audit reports with the state,
engaging in inter-agency borrowing to compensate for cash shortages and inaccurately reporting
financial records.72 Within the first two years of management, much of the city government was
either removed from office or stripped of all decision-making powers. These first two years also saw
a significant spike in water rates; many city services were outsourced and inexpensive land in the city
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was opened to private corporations for development. In 2014, after four years of financial
emergency and two EMs, Benton Harbor’s financial deficit had been “eliminated,” and city control
was officially reinstated in 2016, making it a 6-year process in all.73

TABLE 5 – History of Emergency Management by City
History of Emergency Management by City
City

Emergency Manager Y?N

Notes

Birmingham

N

Flint

Y

2002-2004, 2011-2015

Benton Harbor

Y

2010-2014

St. Joseph

N

Source: Data from Michigan Department of Treasury, “Financial Emergency Information: Archive Municipalities and
School Districts,” accessed May 15, 2021, https://www.michigan.gov/treasury/0,4679,7-121-1751_51556_64472--,00.html.

Contrary to the intended results of emergency management, Benton Harbor’s debt to net
asset ratio increased during the state takeover, from 0.88 in 2010 to 1.4 in 2014.74 A value of 0.8
indicates that debt finances over 80% of a city’s assets and 1.36, or over 136%, are financed through
debt. Financially stable cities have a value of 0.25 or lower. However, Benton Harbor’s revenue to
expenditure ratio did improve. Before the intervention, the city’s revenue to expenditure ratio was
consistently below .96, demonstrating that revenues could not cover 100% of the city expenditures,
but this increased to 1.17 in 2014, indicating the city now had a surplus.75 However, this indicator
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only infers the city's short-term financial stability, and higher debt to net asset ratio indicates longterm financial instability. Once the surplus has run out, the city would again be unable to cover all its
debts.
The citizens of Benton Harbor, through this process, were stripped of their local political
power and voice. Two outsiders had almost full control of the local government and its dealings for
cost-cutting. They dictated the lives of a community that they did not understand. This lack of
political representation, especially regarding drinking water policy, is a substantial procedural
environmental justice concern. The local policy process did not engage citizens, nor did it aim to
include them. Instead, it specifically disclosed them from the process, barring their ability to
contribute politically and diminished their political power. The recent inability of the water treatment
plant to properly collect samples, maintain essential treatment equipment functioning and provide
timely public education materials to the public could be a legacy of this emergency management
period.
Flint’s first state receivership began in 2002. The city faced nearly a $30 million budgetary
deficit. The governor suggested the appointment of a Flint native for the position. Flint residents
fought the merits of the state receivership in court because they did not want state intervention into
their local government. 76 Residents ultimately lost the case in September of 2002. During the first
two years, the E.M. issued 120 directives that slashed the city’s budget by promoting stricter
enforcement codes for rental inspections, the emergency demolitions of blighted buildings, mass
layoffs of city workers, and an 11% increase in water bills.77 Though effective at temporarily lifting a
city out of financial emergency, raising water rates disadvantages an already marginalized population,
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the Black residents of Flint. Already subject to the effects of generational economic disinvestment,
rising unemployment rates, and low political power, increased water rates disproportionately
disadvantaged Black residents unable to afford the increase. This is a distributive and procedural
justice issue. Those most affected by the decisions did not influence the planning process and many
Black residents living in poverty couldn’t afford to pay the increased rate. This either left families
without water entirely or having to cut costs and not pay for other essential items, such as food,
electric bills, medical expenses, or home payments. In 2004, emergency management ended after the
E.M. reduced the city’s budget deficit by $16 million. 78
This period only created temporary financial stability and the city returned to financial
emergency again in 2011 with a $25 million budgetary deficit. In 2011, the state appointed a former
temporary Mayor of Flint as the city’s first E.M. 2011. Flint would eventually see three more E.M.
pass through the position over the next three years. Quickly, the E.M. terminated the city
government and eliminated the pay for the mayor and all members city council. On the eve of the
referendum vote that would nullify the current E.M. law, the E.M. issued 12 executive orders. One
of these executive orders announced the immediate adoption of a 2013-2014 budget plan, skipping
the scheduled public hearings in the coming months.79 Bypassing the budget through without public
comment, an important procedural justice component in the policy-making process, the E.M.
eliminated Flint residents’ public access to their government and use of their tax money. In 2014,
under the direction of the E.M. at the time, the city council voted 7-1 for the switch from the
DWSD to the K.W.A. 80 Although, local council members did not agree to use the Flint River in the
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interim, the E.M. chose to do so to cut costs. The E.M. and other state officials also saved costs by
not immediately treating the river water with corrosion control after the switch, though it is an
E.P.A. mandate.
Almost immediately, residents began to complain about the smell, taste, and appearance of
the water.81 In January 2015, Flint’s received its fourth and final E.M. amongst intensifying local
protests. Flint residents mobilized at city commission meetings, expressing outrage at the discolored
and foul-smelling water running into their homes, the lack of E.M. or state recognition of the
problem, and the rashes appearing on their children. Residents reclaimed their political power and
their right to engage in the policy process through these actions. Despite this, state officials
continued to insist that the water was fine. 82 They used their authority and perceived power to
dismiss public concerns and discredit local voices. This helped maintain an imbalanced power
dynamic in favor of white state officials and a white E.M. that dictated policy and Flint's lowincome, majority Black residents.
Contrary to their claims, it was not fine. Resident-organized studies, another example of
reclaimed procedural power by Flint residents, revealed that the 252 homes tested where lead had
spiked, approximately 17% of them tested in Action Level Exceedance, or above 15ppb and 40% of
samples tested around 5ppb.83 A separate study would reveal that blood levels in Flint children had
doubled in less than a year and were triple in some areas.84 In March of 2015, city council members
voted to switch back to the DWSD, a decision blocked by the E.M., who left their position not soon
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after. Before leaving, the last E.M. signed several orders into effect that the city could not revise
until one year after receivership ended. The city eventually switched back to the DWSD system in
October 2015, over a year and a half later.85
Feeling systematically oppressed and silenced by state officials, Flint residents took the state
to court over the drinking water switch. Several civil lawsuits arose from this crisis, attempting to
hold various state and individual parties responsible for their involvement.86 As of January 2021,
eight former state officials, including former Governor Snyder, and two of Flint’s former E.M.,
received criminal charges for their roles in the crisis that has been since linked to 12 deaths and 80
cases of Legionnaires’ disease.87 Unfortunately, Flint’s vast political and economic
disenfranchisement, Flint residents had to learn how to advocate for themselves in a system that did
not value their opinion.
This was an extremely traumatic event for the residents of Flint and the crisis represents a
powerful story of injustice between those who have the power to make policy decisions and those
affected by such decisions. The majority Black populated city was politically oppressed, stripped of
power and voice, and disregarded by their E.M.s and other state officials. Though the E.M.s
appointed to Flint would be considered more “insiders” than those appointed in Benton Harbor,
since two were former temporary mayors of the city compared, these “insiders” did not provide
additional representation for the citizens of Flint. Instead, they further imposed a system of
environmental and racial injustices that had dramatic health, social and political consequences. The
constant rotation of E.M.s also created chaos and additional instability for the city power structure
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in a time of upheaval. The disparate state agency response to the crisis, while it was ongoing,
resulted from the systemic environmental racism built into the structure of Flint through its history
of economic and political disinvestment.

V.

CONCLUSION
The findings indicate that race, income, and housing tenure remain important indicators of a

city’s ability to provide procedural and distributive justice to its residents. Birmingham and St.
Joseph are both majority-white cities with high median incomes and high homeownership rates. As
such, they do not exhibit the traits associated with Harvard’s theory of low political power leading to
environmental racism or injustice. They can regularly invest in their water infrastructure and conduct
proper water treatment techniques to fight lead corrosion. For example, St. Joseph had more lead
pipes than any other city in the analysis, but no drinking water violations. Due to the higher political
power of their residents, the public participation measures that the city government engages in, and
their social demographics, both cities also do not appear to fit into any of the other theories on
environmental racism.
Flint and Benton Harbor have different relationships with environmental racism. Though
environmental justice has come a long way in Flint, seen in the transformation that the city’s public
participation process and infrastructure have undergone since 2015, there is still a great deal of
public distrust in the water quality. For example, there was unequal enforcement of the S.D.W.A.
and the Lead and Copper Rule for a year and a half, during which time officials from the E.P.A., the
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, now E.G.L.E., and the Governor’s Office failed to
address the drinking water violations. The E.P.A. has acknowledged their delayed response and
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failure to provide effective communication and proactive oversight tools.88 Similarly, E.G.L.E. has
since acknowledged that it failed to require the necessary corrosion-control chemicals after the
switch to the Flint River and failed to inventory the lead service lines needed for sampling, both
required by the Lead and Copper Rule.89 In addition, emails released by the Snyder administration
revealed that he might have been aware of the dangers of Flint’s water as early as the fall of 2014, yet
remained silent on the matter.90 These choices not only left Flint residents exposed to unsafe
drinking water, but have destroyed residents’ trust in the government’s ability to provide equal
enforcement going forward. As a result, Flint residents engaged in reactive measures to ensure that
officials heard their voices, demanding procedural justice, rather than proactive actions taken by the
government to protect its citizens from harm and include them in the process.
Following the crisis, Michigan’s Civil Rights Commission held hearings to determine if the
contamination of Flint’s water system violated any civil rights and generated a report.91 Among
other things, this report details how institutional racism through a century of economic
disinvestment, discriminatory housing practices, school segregation and urban sprawl contributed to
the events of the Flint Water Crisis. Decision-makers did not consider the cumulative effects of
these practices when lead was leaching into the water supply. Not only do heightened levels of lead
already have their health risks, but children suffering from malnutrition, a factor associated with high
rates of poverty, are less able to process lead and avoid absorbing it into their bodies.92 These
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cumulative effects disproportionately impacted the city’s majority Black population, a failure of
distributive justice. This report also included testimony that called the emergency manager law
“possibly the single most important violation of the principle of procedural justice in the case of the
Flint Water Crisis.”93 The law functionally stripped Flint residents of their political power and
denied any semblance of meaningful involvement of procedural justice.
Benton Harbor is currently going through a situation not unfamiliar to Flint’s. The city has
tested at high lead levels since 2018, yet city and state action has been slow. The community is less
politically powerful due to its lower median income, lower rates of homeownership, and higher
unemployment rates than its counterpart across the river, St. Joseph. This lack of political power is
reinforced by poor public participation measures taken by the city to include public members and
keep them informed on important environmental issues and the legacy that emergency management
had on the importance of resident’s political voice.
The city also has a vastly understaffed and extremely cost-burdened system. Like Flint,
Benton Harbor has undergone generations of economic disinvestment, loss of industry and jobs,
and white flight. This has concentrated poverty in the now majority Black city. Despite not being in
a financial emergency since 2016, the city remains unable to afford and perform water sampling and
treatment tasks required by regulations, partially because it does not have the staff to carry out these
procedures. In 2018, spurred by city and state inaction at the increased lead levels, the Benton
Harbor Community Water Council (B.H.C.W.C.) formed. B.H.C.W.C. is a grassroots citizens
advisory group that partners with the city’s water plant to help collect the right number of samples
for lead testing. Through the work of this council, Benton Harbor was able to obtain the correct
number of lead and copper samples that regulations require. This council is now a part of the
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Benton Harbor Lead Outreach Partnership, a team of community, local and state partners from
various sectors working to ensure that Benton Harbor residents have access to information and free
resources to reduce lead in water.94 This is another example of the work and impact that reactive
citizen groups and residents can have in response to environmental injustices.
However, environmental justice cannot solely move forward in reactive citizen movements.
It requires proactive governmental measures at all levels to include public participation in a
meaningful manner and regulations that are not ‘neutral’ and thus create further instances of
environmental racism. A good place to start would be the state’s emergency manager law. As the
Civil Rights Commission’s report on Flint indicated, “if you live in Michigan, there is a 10% chance
that you have lived under emergency management since 2009. But if you are a black Michigander,
the odds are 50/50.”95 This law should support cities in economic decline. Instead, it has
disproportionately impacted the lives of Black Michiganders by imposing short-term solutions that
usurp local democracy and are contrary to the long-term interests of the residents. The law also does
not appear to aid in long-term financial stability.96 In addition, regulations like the S.D.W.A. and the
Lead and Copper Rule, also neutral regulations, continue to suffer from a lack of equal enforcement.
Evenly enforced regulations and better funding for cities too cost-burdened to meet the imposed
regulations on their own would ensure environmental justice moving forward.
Bullard was correct in his assessment that cities struggling most with pollution are also those
with a “crumbling infrastructure, ongoing economic disinvestment, a high poverty rate, and an
overloaded health care system.”97 However, this practice does not have to continue. Cities and states
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need to invest more in city public participation efforts. If cities cannot do so, the state should
allocate better funding to support these environmental justice measures. Increased citizen
engagement not only gives them greater political power to influence the process but creates
advocates that can report issues or violations to state or federal agencies, increasing the pressure for
them to act.
To address the cost burden that regulations place on cities, state or federal governments
should be primarily liable as regulated entities concerning drinking water.98 In the current regulatory
scheme, federal and state governments are tasked with regulation and enforcement while cities and
local water authorities are legally responsible for testing, disclosing, and treating violations. If some
of these responsibilities shifted off municipalities and larger governmental units, with more funding
and resources, it would alleviate some of the cost issues associated with implementing the
regulations and ensure correct enforcement. This shift would maintain the primacy structure of the
S.D.W.A. but allow for shared responsibility between cities, states, and the federal government, so
the burden of costs does not fall only on municipalities. The primacy regime of the S.D.W.A. should
remain, with states being the primary implementors and enforcers of policies upon municipalities.
There is too much distance between the federal government and the thousands of municipalities in
the U.S. for effective oversight and implementation. The risk of procedural and distributive
injustices would only increase with this separation.
Environmental justice has come a long way from the protests at Warren County at all levels
of government. There is federal, state and city-level recognition of the movement. However, the
structures of environmental racism are still deeply ingrained in national institutions. Going forward,
environmental justice must continue to be a part of these discussions, drinking water policy or
98
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otherwise, and the national understanding of environmental justice should continue to expand.
Future research could benefit from incorporating a more comprehensive definition of
environmental justice when viewing local, state, or federal policies, as Dr. Mohai outlines in ‘The 17
Principles of Environmental Justice.”99
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